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The Grounding, Response & Oil Dispersion The Grounding The motor tanker Braer loaded with a full cargo of 84,700 tonnes of Norwegian Gulfaks crude oil sailed from Mongstad in Norway on 3rd January 1993 for Quebec in Canada. The planned route would take the vessel through the North Fair Isle Strait, west towards Canada. Adverse weather was experienced as soon as the Braer left Mongstad and during the passage there were severe southerly gales. On the morning of the 4th January 1993, four steel pipe sections, which had been secured on the port side of the after deck, broke loose and were rolling between the port side of the engine casing and the ships port rails. During the evening of the 4th January 1993, after routine adjustments to the auxiliary boiler, difficulty was experienced in re-igniting it. The auxiliary boiler provided steam for the neccessary pre-heating of the heavy oil for the main engine and, pending the resumption of normal steam pressure, the main engine was changed from heavy oil to diesel oil. Shortly after midnight, seawater contamination was discovered in the diesel oil supply line to the boiler and attempts were made to drain it. Some three hours later seawater contamination had also been discovered in the diesel oil service supply to the main engine and the generator. Attempts to drain the water from the diesel oil tanks continued, but at 04.40 hours on Tuesday 5th January 1993 the main engine stopped, followed by the failure of the generator. The vessel was then ten miles to the south of the southern tip of Shetland and her Master informed Lerwick coastguard at 05.19 hours that the Braer had lost engine power and the vessels position. The vessel was drifting north towards Shetland in predominantly south westerly winds of force 10-11 and her Master then requested towage assistance. Approximately two hours after the engines had stopped the Braer had drifted to within four miles of Sumburgh Head and at the coastguards suggestion her Master agreed that non-essential personnel should be removed from the vessel. Fourteen of the 34 crew were taken off by the coastguard helicopter from Sumburgh at 08:25 hours. In the engine room efforts to drain the water contamination and restore power continued. Tugs from the oil terminal at Sullom Voe were already on their way and the tug/supply vessel Star Sirius left Lerwick Harbour to go to the Braer's assistance. At 08:50 hours it was feared that the ship would founder near Horse Island and the experience of the Aegean Sea which burst into flames shortly after grounding lead the coastguard to persuade the captain to abandon ship and the final evacuation of the crew was completed successfully by the Coastguard helicopter. However, because of strong North West local currents the Braer moved against the prevailing wind and missed Horse Island. It was then decided to attempt to land volunteers on the forecastle head of the Braer to release her anchors. This plan had to be abandoned however due to the proximity of the foremast, which precluded safe helicopter operations over the bow. With the arrival on scene of the Star Sirius it was decided to try and establish a tow. The Braer was now a mile south of Horse Island and drifting slowly to the west, influenced by the westerly tidal stream. However, after passing Horse Island the Braer began drifting north again. Her Master and other volunteers were taken back out by the Coastguard helicopter and put back on board the stern of the vessel. Efforts to attach a heaving line were unsuccessful and at 11:19 hours the vessel was confirmed as being grounded at Garths Ness, with oil being seen to flow out into the sea from the moment of impact. At this time the rescue team were safely evacuated by the helicopter. The immediate casue of the accident was the contamination of the diesel oil supply by seawater entering storage tanks via damaged air vent pipes on the deck. The damage to the air vent pipes was caused by one or more of the steel pipe sections that had broken loose on the deck in the severe weather conditions. The Initial Response Between 07:00 and 11:00 hours on the 5th January 1993, three emergency centres were set up: the Shetland Islands Council (SIC) at the Marine Operations Department as part of the oil spill response, provisionally as a Joint Response Centre (JRC), the Marine Pollution Control Unit at Sunley House, London, again as part of the oil spill response and the SIC at the lsleburgh Centre in Lerwick as part of the SIC Emergency Plan. All the related groups concerned with the oil spill plan were contacted and following an offer from the management of Sumburgh Airport a JRC was set up there. The emergency response centre at Marine Operations was then stood down. During this time the Wildlife Response Co-ordinating Committee (WRCC) established a Wildlife Response Centre (WRC) at the Boddam Scout Hut, some 3 miles north of Sumburgh Airport, for the collection and possible rehabilitation of birds, and shortly after, the SIC decided to move its control centre to Sumburgh Airport, thereby centralising the response effort. The Hillswick Wildlife Sanctuary where live Seals and Otters would be taken for rehabilitation was still fairly undeveloped at the time, but a small army of volunteers set to work on it, and it was up and running by the end of the first week of the spill. The Oil Fortunately for Shetland, the Gulfaks crude the Braer was carrying is not a typical North Sea oil. It is lighter and more easily biodegradable than other North Sea crude, and this, in combination with some of the worst storms seen in Shetland (naturally dispersing the oil by wave action and evaporation), prevented the event becoming an even bigger disaster. The following is a brief account of the spread and eventual dispersion of the oil. Tuesday 5th January 1993 (the first day) Following the grounding, the first aerial surveillance flight was underway by 2.45pm. At this stage oil was observed drifting into Quendale Bay from Garths Ness. No counter-pollution measures were taken at sea on this day. The wind during the day was S to SW with a mean speed of 45 mph, gusting up to 90 mph. Wednesday 6th January 1993 WRC volunteers reported large numbers of near-shore fish and invertebrates washed ashore with thick brown floating oil in Quendale Bay during the early morning. Aerial surveillance reported thick floating oil between Siggar Ness and Sumburgh, although in the West Voe of Sumburgh the oil comprised broken sheens. Sheens were present on the west coast, and observed as far north as May Wick by 3pm. The Marine Pollution Control Unit (MPCU) carried out a trial dispersant spraying just after 10 am, which successfully dispersed some of the oil. MPCU Dakotas then commenced spraying of non-dispersed floating oil, although only 100 tonnes of dispersant were used until the operations ceased around 3.45pm. Sprayed oil was observed to disperse to rainbow sheens. The wind during the day had moved to the WSW with a mean spread of 35 mph, gusting up to 88 mph. Thursday 7th January 1993 The morning surveillance flight indicated that oil had reached the southern tip of Burra Isle on the west coast and Lambhoga Head on the east coast. A helicopter was used to spray a very small quantity of dispersant near the wreck, but this had to be abandoned due to the adverse weather conditions, and no other spraying took place. A surveillance flight at 3pm showed no northward movement of oil since the morning. The wind was SW during the day with a mean speed of 36 mph, gusting to 68 mph. Friday 8th January 1993 Further deterioration of the weather occurred and the first sheens were observed in Loch of Spiggie. Waves of up to 10m high were reported to be dispersing the oil naturally. Sheens of oil were observed as far north as Scalloway on the west coast, and heavy sheens were reported near fish farms in Clift Sound. Thin streaks of light sheen were reported on the east coast, as far north as Mousa although there was little northwards movement of oil (only about a half-mile on the west coast) during the day. No spraying took place. The wind was WSW with a mean speed of 41 mph gusting to 85 mph. Saturday 9th January 1993 A major new release of oil appeared to have occurred overnight. Sheen had spread as far north as the southern tip of Bressay on the east coast, and Weisdale Voe and Sand Voe on the west coast. This appears to have been the maximum extent of surface oil movement observed during the spill. This was the last day on which spraying took place, and 20 tonnes of dispersant were used. The wind was mainly WSW with a mean speed of 33 mph knots gusting to 65 mph. Sunday 10th January 1993 No counter-pollution activity was possible due to the strongly gusting winds and aerial surveys indicated little oil on the sea's surface, except near the wreck. Sheens were observed just north of Foraness, on the west coast, and Lambogha Head, on the east coast. Considerable natural dispersion was observed to have occurred. The wind was predominantly SW with a mean speed of 35 mph gusting to 91 mph. Monday 11th January 1993 The vessel began to break up during the day, and a massive release of oil occurred during the afternoon. A heavy hydrocarbon odour was reported as far north as Lerwick during the evening. Infra-red imagery had suggested that a large part of the cargo was still in the vessel until the ship broke up. The extent of the oil on the surface was similar to the previous day, although heavy oil concentrations were reported between Siggar Ness and Sumburgh Head. The wind was SSW with a mean speed of 40 mph gusting to 71 mph. Tuesday 12th January 1993 The vessel broke into three sections and the remaining cargo was released. The weather conditions were severe, and the surveillance flight could not be made until 2pm. Considerable physical dispersion of oil occurred. Brown foam was reported in the surf zone along the west coast. The wind was WSW with a mean speed of about 37 mph gusting to 79 mph. Wednesday 13th January 1993 and after Aerial surveillance on the 13th indicated no change in the extent of surface oil pollution from the previous day, although sheens and brown foam in the surf zone were less noticeable. Regular surveillance flights by MPCU continued until the 25th January, with Sullom Voe Terminal helicopter flights thereafter. The level of visible surface pollution declined throughout the second week after the grounding, although some fresh oil appeared to escape from the vessel on the 15th January, while a small release of lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid was observed on the 19th January. On the east Mainland coast silver sheens were seen in the immediate vicinity of Sumburgh Head on the 15th and 16th January, although with the exception of these observations, the east coast was reported to be largely free of surface oil pollution. On the west coast, silver streaks, rainbow sheens and brown foam were reported along large parts of the coast, as far west as Giltarump from the 14th-18th January. On the 19th January, the extent of the sheens and brown foam was limited to the coastline between the Bay of Scousburgh to Skelda Ness on the west coast. From then on, areas of silver streaks were seen in the vicinity of Burra and Oxna, but never west of Skelda Ness, while brown foam was frequently observed as late as early February, particularly off west Burra. Minor releases of very small quantities of oil (probably of the order of 10-100 litres), mainly comprising hydraulic fluids or lubricating oils, continued into the first week of February. The weather remained poor through to the 3rd week of January with predominantly SW winds with a mean speed of around 35 knots, although the 13th and the 17th saw more exceptional gales with winds gusting over 100 mph. |
Braer drifting towards Garth's Ness. |
Coastguard taking off crew. |
Star Sirius attempting tow. |
Oil leaking shortly after grounding. |
Vessel sinking. |
Vessel breaking up. |
MPCU Dakota spraying dispersant. |
Sunken Vessel most of the oil lost. |
Film crew at the wreck. |
Rainbow sheens along SW coast. |
Vessel broken up. |
Last remaining section. |
Maps of the oil movement along the coastline during January (blue arrow shows direction of wind). |
Film crew on oiled beach. |
"The immediate casue of the accident was contamination of the diesel fuel oil supply by seawater entering storage tanks via damaged air vent pipes on the deck. The damage to the air vent pipes was caused by one or more steel pipe sections that had broken loose on the deck in the severe weather conditions." Text from the summary of the events surrounding the grounding in the Marine Accident Investigation Branch "Report of the Chief Investigator of Marine Accidents into the engine failure and subsequent grounding of the Motor Tanker Braer". For a detailed account of the cause of the grounding, download the full report here (pdf file 2.9mb). Photos accompanying the report avialable here (pdf file 490k). |
braer.net |
M.V. Braer grounding and oil spill Garth's Ness, Shetland, 5 Jan 1993 |
Protection of Wrecks Statutory Instrument 1993 No. 199 The Protection of Wrecks (MV Braer) Order 1993. Made 5th February 1993. Laid before Parliament 6th February 1993. Coming into force 8th February 1993 The Secretary of State being satisfied that the vessel identified in article 2 of the following Order is, because of oil contained in it, in a condition which makes it a potential danger to life or property, and that on that account it ought to be protected from unauthorized interference, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 2(1) and (2) of the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973[1] and all other powers enabling him in that behalf hereby makes the following Order: 1. This Order may be cited as the Protection of Wrecks (MV Braer) Order 1993 and shall come into force on 6th February 1993. 2.- (1) The vessel in respect of which this Order is made is the merchant vessel "BRAER" which lies wrecked at Latitude 59°53'24"N, Longitude 01°21'24"W. 2.- (2) The area within a distance of 500 metres of that position is hereby designated as a prohibited area for the purposes of the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973. Signed by authority of the Secretary of State for Transport Caithness Minister of State, Department of Transport, 5th February 1993 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1993/ Uksi_19930199_en_1.htm |
The Protection of Wrecks (MV Braer) (Revocation) Order 1994 Statutory Instrument 1994 No. 2372 The Protection of Wrecks (MV Braer) (Revocation) Order 1994 Made 9th September 1994, Laid before Parliament 16th September 1994, Coming into force 7th October 1994 Whereas the Protection of Wrecks (MV Braer) Order 1993 designated an area round the wreck of the merchant vessel "Braer" (lying wrecked at Latitude 59°53' 24"N, Longitude 01°21' 24"W) as a prohibited area: And whereas the Secretary of State for Transport is satisfied that the vessel is no longer in a condition which makes it a potential danger to life or property; Now, therefore, the Secretary of State for Transport, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by sections 2(1) and (2) and 3(2) of the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973, and all other powers enabling him in that behalf, hereby makes the following Order: 1. This Order may be cited as the Protection of Wrecks (MV Braer) (Revocation) Order 1994 and shall come into force on 7th October 1994. 2. The Protection of Wrecks (MV Braer) Order 1993 is hereby revoked. Signed by authority of the Secretary of State for Transport Goschen Parliamentary-Under Secretary of State, Department of Transport 9th September 1994. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si1994/ Uksi_19942372_en_1.htm |
Revealed: the truth about Braer oil disaster Jim Wallace, Scotland's justice minister, has called for the inquiry into the sinking of the Braer oil tanker to be re- opened following the discovery of startling new evidence suggesting the ship was so unseaworthy it should have been detained in port. An investigation has discovered that the tanker, which ran aground spilling 84,700 tonnes of crude oil onto the Shetland coastline in January 1993, was not fit when it left Norway on its last voyage. The official inquiry blamed bad weather and worse seamanship. The evidence, which comes from documents that have been hidden for eight years, shows the ship could not have completed its voyage even if it had cleared the Shetland coastline and that there were major problems with its boilers. In his first interview since the disaster, the Braer's captain, Alexandros Gelis, says he was never given the opportunity to refute the report which condemned his seamanship and that he was kept ignorant of the condition of the boilers. Wallace said: "I will seek an assurance that the Chief Inspector of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch will review the previous findings in the light of this new information." The Sunday Herald, April 15 2001 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_qn4156/is_20010415/ai_n1395 8422 |